INTRODUCTION
Virtually all types of capital face idiosyncratic and uninsurable risk. This type of risk is certainly found in human capital and capital invested in privately held firms. Less strongly, it is also found in capital invested in publicly held corporations and residential housing because investors must incur transactions expenses when they need to liquidate these assets. In general, capital and claims on its return are costly to trade because of the market imperfections generated by imperfect information and the costs of writing and enforcing contracts. These trading cost simultaneously lead to an incomplete diversification of idiosyncratic risk and to the demand for a fiduciary asset, such as money, providing to its holders liquidity and a means for self-insurance. Equalizing the return to money to the social return to capital (Friedman's rule on the optimum quantity of money) means that investors prefer money to capital facing idiosyncratic and uninsurable risk. Hence, in a long-run equilibrium where money earns the social return to capital, the government must own all the capital with idiosyncratic and uninsurable risk.
Moreover, this equilibrium is only optimal if the government can manage capital as efficiently as private individuals can.
The model advanced in this paper reformulates the income fluctuations problem by Foley and Hellwig [9] and the related monetary model by Bewley [4] to an economy with endogenous incomes and growth. Instead of owning an stream of endowments as in these earlier papers, individuals own 1 capital. The accumulation of this capital faces an investment irreversibility constraint, and its return has uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. In this environment, money helps to diversify idiosyncratic risks (risk diversification role) and to relax the illiquidity caused by the investment irreversibility constraint (liquidity role). Because of this liquidity role, a positive demand for money is very robust. For example, under fairly general conditions, the demand for money survives even when its rate of return is stochastically dominated by the rate of return to capital.
As is typical in monetary models, the model presented here is highly stylized. Each individual possesses a private and untransferable production technology through which their capital can be invested. This investment is irreversible. The return of each private technology is linear in the capital 2 invested and subject to stochastic shocks. Across time, these shocks are identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.). Meanwhile, across individuals, there may be some dependence on the realization of these shocks, but they are drawn in such a way that there is no aggregate risk and in this sense individual risk is idiosyncratic. With complete markets, idiosyncratic risk would be eliminated through 3 insurance or through a diversified portfolio. However, the model assumes that individuals' identity, capital, and output are private information and known only by these individuals themselves. Therefore, idiosyncratic risk cannot be diversified away, and capital cannot be used as collateral for loans.
Individuals can partly self-insure by holding money. In other words, individuals can sell part of the output they obtained for money after a favorable shock, and use this money to finance their expenditures in the event of a bad shock.
Analyzing individuals' behavior in this environment has an interest of its own as it extends the income fluctuations problem in [9] to a framework where wealth can grow endogenously without bound. This unbounded growth implies that the wealth distribution of individuals does not converge to a stationary distribution, but it becomes increasingly disperse. In general, the lack of a stationary distribution of wealth creates a problem because it precludes a stable aggregation of the individuals' behavior necessary to construct a balanced path for the economy. Fortunately, this problem can be solved with the same assumptions that imply the existence of a balanced growth path equilibrium for a single individual; namely, the homogeneity of preferences and the linear homogeneity of technologies.
These assumptions, though, bring some technical difficulties in the analysis because neither opportunity sets, utility functions, nor their first derivatives are necessarily bounded, as is normally assumed in standard arguments in the income fluctuations problem. Because of these difficulties, these standard arguments need to be replaced with new arguments suitable to the present context. In the present model, money improves efficiency by allowing individuals to self-insure. In the absence of money, an equilibrium is inefficient because of the assumption that the idiosyncratic risk to individual investments is uninsurable. Individuals can self-insure with money; that is they can consume above their income when the return to their capital is low. In an equilibrium with a constant money supply, money brings this welfare improvement without any other demand on the government other than its ability to convince individuals that money is and will remain valuable. This ability to provide confidence on money may be linked to the taxing powers of the government, but in equilibrium, with a constant money supply, these powers are not exercised. Unfortunately, with a constant money supply, the rate of return to money approaches the growth rate of output, which falls short of the social return to capital. Hence, there is an opportunity cost of self-insuring with money, and in general individuals will not fully insure themselves. The equilibrium with a constant money supply remains inefficient despite the positive welfare role of money.
In principle, the self-insurance role of money can be enhanced by raising the rate of return to money towards the social rate of return to capital. In the limit, first best efficiency can be achieved if these two rates are equalized. This is Friedman's rule on the optimum quantity of money (see [10, 4, 20] .) However, when this rule is implemented, individuals prefer money to capital facing idiosyncratic 4 uninsurable risk. Hence, in order to implement this rule, the government must effectively own the entire capital stock invested in the private technologies with idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, this policy is only optimal if the government is able to manage this capital as efficiently as private individuals. In this instance, the monetary system plays the role of a gigantic mutual fund that effectively diversifies idiosyncratic risk. The problem with creating this mutual fund is the extraordinary managing abilities demanded from the government. In the absence of these abilities, Friedman's rule cannot be implemented.
The traditional approach of using taxation to implement Friedman's rule is closely related to the public ownership of the capital invested in private technologies. Both taxes and public ownership are fiscal revenue sources founded on government's entitlement to claim a portion of the output produced in the private sector. With taxation, Friedman's rule can only be implemented with a 100 percent tax on the returns to capital with idiosyncratic risk coupled with a 100 percent subsidy on the investment of this type of capital. As a result, this policy is equivalent to the public ownership of capital with idiosyncratic risk.
The present analysis of the optimum quantity of money complements the work in [5, 13, 15, 17, 19] on the difficulties of implementing Friedman's rule when money plays a precautionary role. In all these papers, individuals own a stream of endowments and money is the only asset for transferring purchasing power across periods. Furthermore, the government pays for the money supply reductions with the revenue of a uniform lump-sum tax, or it spends the money supply expansions financing a uniform lump-sum subsidy. The revenue from a uniform lump-sum tax is bounded by the minimal income each individual receives each period. Hence, the money supply reductions are also bounded, and Friedman's rule may not be attainable or even approximated. Moreover, the distributional effect of using a uniform lump-sum tax to finance reductions of the money supply is likely to be perverse for welfare. For example, in [17] individuals get net positive transfers when their money balances are high and, on average, their marginal utility of consumption is low. The present analysis differs from this earlier work by considering the case that individuals own capital instead of a stream of endowments. This setup offers the conceptual possibility that the government avoids the uniform lump-sum tax to implement Friedman's rule by purchasing all the capital, managing it efficiently, and using its return to finance reductions of the money supply. The difficulty here is the realism of assuming that the government is capable of performing such a task.
In summary, this paper extends the work of Foley and Hellwig [9] and Bewley [4] by incorporating endogenous incomes, capital accumulation, and growth. In this context, money plays both a risk diversification role and a liquidity role. This extension provides a framework in which to reexamine the difficulties in implementing Friedman's rule on the optimal quantity of money. The main outcome from this analysis is an impossibility result. The government cannot implement a first best efficient allocation with a deflation that equates the return to money to the social return to capital without gaining effective ownership of the capital stock and being able to operate this stock as efficiently as private agents can. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes individual behavior. Section 4 constructs a balanced path equilibrium for the economy. Section 5 reexamines the problem of implementing Friedman's rule on the optimal quantity of money. Finally, section 6 discusses generalizations to the present model and concludes. An appendix collects all the proofs.
THE MODEL
Consider an economy populated with a continuum of individuals. In this economy, individuals possess an untransferable production technology through which their capital can be invested. Capital is the unique input used by these technologies. Output is homogeneous and can either be consumed or invested. Investment is irreversible; that is, once a portion of the good is allocated as capital to a particular technology it can neither be consumed nor relocated to a technology belonging to any other individual. All individual production technologies are stochastic and yield constant returns to scale.
Stochastic shocks are drawn so that the individual return to capital is risky, whereas it social return is not. Individuals can easily hide their identity, their capital, and the output this capital produces.
Consequently, individuals cannot insure the idiosyncratic risk affecting the return to their capital.
Likewise, individuals cannot borrow against their capital. Instead, individuals can partly insure themselves by trading the good for money. After a favorable shock, they can sell part of their output for money. Thus, in the event of a bad shock, they can spend this money to finance their expenditures.
The fact that individuals cannot eliminate the variability of the private return to capital is crucial for money to be valued in this model. That is, money would be unnecessary with costless contracts leading to perfectly diversified firms, full insurance, or frictionless equity markets. All these contracts involve credit from individuals with a high return on their technology to individuals with a low return. For moral hazard reasons, the assumption that individuals can hide their identity, their capital, and the output
; ; µ 9 this capital produces precludes the viability of these contracts. Thus, this assumption is equivalent to the assumption common to many theoretical monetary models that there is no technology to enforce credit contracts (e.g. [16] ). At the cost of complicating the model, one could assume weaker forms of imperfect information leading to a costly enforcement of credit/insurance contracts to preclude the elimination of all idiosyncratic risk. For simplicity, these alternative assumptions are not pursued in this paper. 
Max Max Min
The individuals' horizon is infinite, their preferences are time additive, and their instantaneous utility function is isoelastic. In recursive form, the utility of i is:
where ß = discount factor (ß > 0); and s = coefficient of relative risk aversion (s > 0, and utility is logarithmic if s = 1).
Because of its liquidity services, individuals demand money even if its rate of return is stochastically dominated by the rate of return to capital. Without the irreversibility constraint on capital, the demand for money is just a demand for diversifying risk. With the irreversibility constraint, the demand for money is also a demand for liquidity and is likely to be positive for a wide range of parameters. For example, the demand for money is always positive if z = 0 and the return factor For the time being, I assume that the money supply is constant. In principle, the money supply may change if the government uses taxes or transfers to change its quantity. This possibility is postponed until Section 5. As long as the nominal quantity of money is constant, the only economic transactions in the economy consist of exchanges of money and output in a market that takes place every period. Using the fact that z is independent of k, this market clearing condition can be stated as follows: 
where subscripts denote time and the present is normalized to be period zero. A recursive application of this condition implies the following relation:
The irreversibility constraint lowers the value of an investment next period unless the constraint is not to be strictly binding with probability one.
To ensure that the individual's problem is properly defined, one must ensure that there is at most one feasible path that yields infinite utility to the individual. Also, one must ensure that there is at least one feasible path for which utility is different from minus infinity. As shown in proposition 3.1 below, the following assumption achieves both objectives. 
Min (iii) For all preferences parameters, Condition 3.1 is satisfied if the survival rate is sufficiently high, and the distribution of zN is sufficiently disperse.
The linear homogeneity of G implies that wealth grows stochastically, so that in general the level of wealth does not converge to an invariant distribution. In contrast, the proportion of liquid wealth over capital is bounded, so that an invariant distribution for s (the ratio y / k) exists. The monotone properties of G imply convergence to this distribution in the long-run. Also, the following lemma provides a "mixing" result that implies uniqueness of this distribution.
). implies that the allocation of aggregate output depends on how aggregate capital is divided among the
LEMMA 3.1: Let s = (m / k) (1 + r) + z , where (m / k) is the ratio mN / kN in Regime
The first equality in (10) is a definition. The second equality in (10) follows from the linear homogeneity of G and the aggregation of all individuals with a common s. To construct a balanced path equilibrium, one must find an invariant distribution for K / K. Let ? 0? (S) be the present cumulative frequency of s K / K, and let T be an internal operator in ? (S) that maps ? onto the next period cumulative frequency
where g is the third element of G(s,1). The sought invariant distribution of K / K is a fixed point ? of 
The two fixed points would be identical if sN were independent of s (P could be taken out of the integrals in (11) and (12)), or if g were a constant (g could be taken out of the integrals in (11)). In k k general, the two fixed points differ because the transition function P is monotone with s, and g is k increasing (strictly for some states). The following proposition establishes the properties of T and the * convergence of the cumulative frequency of K / K to a unique invariant distribution ? . including money. The next section examines the policies required to achieve this end.
THE OPTIMUM QUANTITY OF MONEY
This section analyzes policies aimed to remedy the inefficiency caused by the gap between the return to money and the social return to capital. To narrow this gap the government can pay interest on money or change the rate of deflation. As these policies are equivalent in this model, I will assume no interest is paid on money. In this case, the Friedman's rule to achieve first best efficiency calls for a rate of deflation equal to the social return to capital. With the simplifications made, the social return to capital is constant along a balanced path, so that there is no need for risk adjustments. (This absence of aggregate risk is not essential to the main results presented below.)
With a constant money supply, the rate of deflation falls short of the social return to capital meaning that a government seeking to implement Friedman's rule must steadily reduce the money supply. I will assume that the government uses a combination of lump-sum taxes and income from publicly owned capital to finance these reductions of the money supply. Thus, in this section, I assume that the government is able to invest in capital to obtain a constant real net return r . This ability can be g interpreted in two ways, both yielding identical results. One interpretation is that the government owns a technology different from private technologies in which it can invest the capital it owns. The other interpretation, more in tune with the rest of the paper, is that the government can invest in the private technologies to obtain an aggregate return without risk. This return may differ from the average return of 
The government must own all the capital stock.
( The realism of the capabilities demanded from the government in Proposition 5.1 is ultimately an empirical matter. However, the conventional wisdom is that governments are worse administrators of their capital than the private sector. Hence, Proposition 5.1 should be seen as an impossibility result.
Friedman's rule cannot be implemented to improve efficiency if either the ownership of capital must be private or the return to public capital falls short of the social return to capital.
As in [5] , Proposition 5.1 implies that if the government must rely only on lump-sum taxes to finance the reductions of the money supply, Friedman's rule cannot be achieved. Suppose, as in [5] , that the only fiscal instrument the government possesses is a lump-sum tax uniform across individuals.
With a lump-sum tax the first order conditions (7) and (9) of the individuals' optimal plans are not affected, but their budget constraint is. Also, when a lump-sum tax is used to reduce the supply of money, it affects the equilibrium condition (6), and as a result, changes the rate of deflation in the economy. For the tax to be able to support a steady deflation, the tax revenue must grow at the same rate as the economy. The characterization of a balanced path equilibrium follows similar steps to those in Section 4. This characterization now implies that the return to money equals the rate of growth of the economy minus the rate at which the money supply is reduced. This equilibrium, though, only exists if the uniform lump-sum tax is sufficiently small so that all individuals are able to pay it. In this model (and in reality!), this puts a very low bound on the tax. In this model, even if the economy settles into a balanced path with a constant rate of growth for aggregate variables, as long as idiosyncratic risk is not eliminated, the individuals' wealth distribution is increasingly disperse. Therefore, even if we were to start with an equal distribution of wealth, the wealth of some individuals will become insignificant relative to that of others. In fact, if the survival rate is less than one (µ < 1) and the investment irreversibility constraint is binding for some individuals along the balanced path, then the wealth of some individuals drifts to zero with probability one. Therefore, in this case, even if the gross rate of return to capital is positive (z > 0), gross income drifts to zero, and so an equilibrium fails to exists for any positive Min uniform lump-sum tax.
Lump-sum taxes do not need to be uniform across individuals. In the present model, a consumption tax at a constant rate is equivalent to a lump-sum tax proportional to wealth. This consumption tax transfers a portion of wealth, which includes private capital, money, and income, to the government. As the tax rate on consumption increases, private risk becomes diversified because both the value of private capital and its uninsured return falls in consumption units. Nevertheless, there is no finite tax rate that is capable of reducing private risk to zero. This difficulty rules out Friedman's rule, but it does not rule out a close approximation. There are, however, other difficulties with a consumption tax (and, in general, with other taxes that discriminate across individuals as discussed in [15] ). To approximate Friedman's rule, consumption taxes must be extremely high and collected at a zero monitoring cost. For example, the government must be able to costlessly enforce a system in which $99.99 of every $100 paid by buyers goes to taxes while the remaining $0.01 goes to the seller. In addition, for the tax to be efficient the government must be able to perfectly measure consumption. This assumption is very strong both in reality and in a model where individuals can hide their economic activities. If the government can only measure consumption with error, a scheme which taxes consumption and subsidizes money in order to promote social insurance may easily increase the risk faced by private individuals. The second best monetary policy in this case depends on the relative variability of the measurement error on consumption and the private return to capital. This second best may be far from the Friedman's rule.
SUMMARY AND EXTENSIONS
This paper has analyzed a simple model where money plays a risk diversification role that partly insulates consumption from the uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, and a liquidity role that relaxes the constraints imposed by investment irreversibility. This model provides intuitive results on the difficulties for engineering a deflation that equates the rate of return to money to the social rate of return to capital (Friedman's rule on the optimal quantity of money). The implementation of this rule converts the monetary system into a huge mutual fund whose assets are the capital with idiosyncratic risk and whose liabilities are the money supply. For this rule to be efficient, the government must be as able to efficiently operate capital as private individuals. If this is not possible, or if the ownership of capital must be private, the return to money cannot be equated to the social return to capital.
The simplifying assumptions about the private technology and the stochastic environment throughout the paper were done mainly to facilitate the description of the balanced path equilibrium.
This section briefly describes some extensions to the basic model, and how they affect the analysis of the optimum quantity of money.
The assumption that investment is irreversible plays a role in ensuring a positive demand for money. If capital is a flexible asset, the money's only role is to diversify individual risk. That is, money is demanded by risk averse individuals that are willing to sacrifice in the margin the high expected return to capital for the safe return to money. In this case, a positive demand for money exists only when the rate of return to money is sufficiently close to the expected social rate of return to capital. This existence problem, though, is not an issue for economies where these two rates are very close as it is the case for economies following or close to following Friedman's rule.
The absence of aggregate risk can also be easily relaxed. With aggregate risk, first best efficiency still calls for eliminating the gap between the return to money and the social return to capital.
Hence the return to money must be risky. Arguments parallel to those in Proposition 5.1 imply that this first best can be achieved if and only if all capital is publicly owned and the public return to capital is equal to the social return to capital. The reductions of the money supply must now depend on the stochastic social return to capital which provides the funds to equate the return to money to the social return to capital.
The motives for holding money can also be easily enlarged. With shocks to private technologies that are not i.i.d. across time, the demand for money incorporates both a transaction motive and a speculative motive. For example, suppose individuals obtain the output from their production technology once every thirty periods with different individuals receiving their output at different times.
The return to capital on the thirtieth day is still stochastic but has a low variance. In this variation of the model, the main motive for holding money is to buy consumption during the twenty-nine periods without income. Thus, it incorporates a typical transaction demand for money. Another example, suppose the productivity of the private production technologies can be imperfectly predicted at the moment investment takes place. In this variation of the model, an additional motive for holding money is to concentrate investment in periods with good prospects on the private return to capital. Thus, this variation would incorporate a speculative demand for money. Although these variations complicate the description of a long-run equilibrium, they add little to the results on the optimum quantity of money in Section 5. The only key assumption in Proposition 5.1 is that the private return to capital contains an idiosyncratic component, which due to market imperfections cannot be insured.
Both the idiosyncrasy on the return to capital and the complete irreversibility of investment could be relaxed with transaction costs to trade physical capital and idiosyncratic shocks to the ability to supply human capital as in [1] . For similar reasons as elicited in Section 5, the return to money 9 cannot be raised to equal the social return to capital without the government owning all the physical as well as human capital. In this case, the uninsurable idiosyncratic risk of owning physical capital is the transactions expenses that must be incurred to sell out this capital when a bad shock hits an individual.
Finally, the model can be extended to enrich the financial sector in the economy. First, the model can be extended to include several types of government securities differentiated by their liquidity and their rate of return. Highly liquid securities with a low return can then be interpreted as moneys, while less liquid securities with a higher return can be interpreted as government debt. In a separate paper [7] , I pursue this extension in a deterministic version of the model. Second, the model can be extended to include financial markets and private financial intermediaries. For example, one could 10 assume that private financial intermediaries could pool idiosyncratic risk and provide credit at a positive resource cost. In such a world, the government issued currency would coexist with the liabilities issued by the private financial intermediaries in a way similar to the coexistence of currency, deposits, and mutual funds in the United States. Monetary policies must then be integrated into the wider overall design and regulation of the financial system.
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREMS
The proofs that follow are abbreviated because they are mainly based on standard dynamic programming arguments. See [6, Appendix B] for a more detailed version of these proofs.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.1: Part (i) follows from the theorems in [2] . To apply these theorems for s $ 1, the ratio c / x must be bounded away from zero. It is possible to construct this bound so it never binds, because for s $ 1 y / x $ z > 0. For k =1, the demands for kN and mN are weakly increasing with respect to y, so lower bound constraints on these choices if they bind, they must do so for low levels of y. Also, when the irreversibility constraint is not binding the demands for kN and mN are proportional to x. These two facts imply the following two ordering conditions. If regime C exists, it must be for the lowest interval of (8) and (9) hold always with equality. Condition z < z Min 2 rules out the second case as it contradicts condition (7). Finally, the condition z < z rules out the Min 3 third case as it contradicts that the individual cannot raise utility by a marginal shift of savings from investment to money (conditions (7) to (9) , sN) . Consequently, the definition of T can be simplified as follows: ? ). Likewise, because P ( @ , sN) is nonincreasing, the integral in (13) is at least as large for ? than for 1 1 ? . This proves (ii). 
. Therefore, the monotone property of T implies:
.., all all ? 0 ? (S). [ , (7) is satisfied if r = g. Hence it suffices to prove that there is a pair r and r in the range 1 2 for which r # g , and r $ g . The inequality r # g is clearly satisfied for r z with equality, so together with (7) to (9) implies
The normality implies the covariance term is negative. Consequently, as long as private gross investment is positive, Hence if private investment must be zero, and in a balanced path equilibrium private capital must be zero as well. This proves (i).
Suppose the government reduces the money supply with the proceeds from taxes and the return of public capital. The government's flow budget is where K g = public capital, and T = current real taxes collected by the government. Along a balanced path g equilibrium with and grow rate g, this budget constraint simplifies to Dividing by r -g, Consequently, the money supply is backed with the present value of the net cash flow from public capital plus the present value of future taxes, both discounted at the rate r. This proves (ii).
As part (i) shows, in a balanced path where all capital is publicly owned, so the effective return to capital along this balanced path is r . As part (ii) implies, money can only earn a g higher return than r if the government collects lump-sum taxes to subsidize the monetary system. This Then, the continuity of G is implied by the fact that it is upper-hemi-continuous. Finally, it remains to show that when s $ 1 there is a positive a for which the constraint c $ ax will never be binding, so these results apply to the problem without this constraint. For x = 1, the minimum liquid wealth, to be denoted y , is z / (z + µ) > 0. Let
As it is well known, For k =1, the demands for kN and mN are weakly increasing with respect to y, so lower bound constraints on these choices if they bind, they must do so for low levels of y. Moreover, when the irreversibility constraint is not binding the demands for kN and mN are proportional to x. These two facts imply the following two ordering conditions. If regime C exists, it must be for the lowest interval of ( , , ). * * * c m k irreversibility constraint would not bind in the next period with probability one. As a result, conditions (7) to (9) ( ) of (ii) implies that mN = 0 and kN > µ for all y. Second, kN = µ at y = z . In this case, the proof of (ii)
Max implies that mN = 0 and kN = µ at y = z as well. And third, kN > µ at y = z , but kN = µ at y = z .
Min Max Min
The condition z < z rules out the first case by showing that this inequality contradicts that Min 1 conditions (8) and (9) hold always with equality. If kN > µ for all y, consumption is always proportional to wealth. Let ? be the constant of proportionality. Using (8) and (9) with equality, ? can be easily solved to get The condition kN $ µk is contradicted if
The condition z < z rules out the second case by showing that this inequality contradicts ? ). Likewise, because P( @ , sN) is nonincreasing, the integral in (13) is at least as large for ? than for 1 1 ? . This proves (ii). Define S = [s , s ) 1 S (set of states where the irreversibility constraint is strictly binding).
o
Min *
Suppose the following condition is satisfied: (15) There is a positive real e and a positive integer N such that P (s , s ) < 1 -e. inequality r # g is clearly satisfied for r = 1 -µ, because the rate of growth of capital is bounded 
The normality of consumption (preferences are homogeneous) implies that the covariance term in (17) is negative. Consequently, as long as private gross investment is positive, the return on money is lower than the expected return on capital: This would contradict that the optimum quantity Dividing by r -g, this equation is transformed into:
Consequently, the money supply is backed with the present value of the net cash flow from public capital plus the present value of future taxes, both discounted at the rate r. This proves (ii).
As part (1) shows, in a balanced path where all capital is publicly owned, so the effective return on capital along this balanced path is r . As part (ii) implies, money can only earn a g higher return than r if the government collects lump-sum taxes to subsidize the monetary system. This g policy is clearly inefficient as it leads to a disparity between the marginal rates of substitution and transformation between present and future output. Furthermore, if the lump-sum taxes are non z − − ( ) 1 µ 45 redistributive (proportional to the wealth of private individuals), a Pareto improvement can be achieved with a monetary reform that cancels taxes and maintains money fully backed with public capital. That is, a monetary reform that changes the return on money from to r . This reform is a Pareto g improvement because with money being fully backed with public capital holding money is equivalent to holding public capital. If an individual were to choose not to invest in his/her private technology, the optimal deterministic path with a net rate of return on wealth equal to r is both feasible and superior to g the deterministic path for this individual before the reform as it eliminates the distortion between the marginal rates of substitution and transformation. The fact that the individual can invest in his/her private technology further improves his/her well being after the reform~ 1.Growth is endogenous because production functions are linear in capital as in [3] .
2.Several other papers have also added capital to Bewley's model [4] , for example: [1, 11, 21] .
3.Independence across individuals would provide an intuitive and widely used device to eliminate aggregate risk. However, this type of independence with a continuum of individuals leads to technical difficulties. (See [8, 12] ).
4.See [4] for references to earlier work advocating this rule.
5.See Proposition 2 p. 29 in [8] for the consistency of this assumption when independence across individuals is not imposed.
6.See for example [14, Section I] where multiplicity of equilibria is discussed at depth in a random matching model.
7.These conditions already incorporate that the inequality constraints in (2) will never bind for c.
8.In this equilibrium, taxes may be zero and then the money supply is fully backed with public capital.
However, this is not necessarily the case, since the government may induce private individuals to hold additional quantities of money, which is the only public debt instrument in the model, by making them pay taxes in the future. If these taxes cause no direct incentive effects and do not redistribute wealth, the taxes will just raise the initial real holdings of money without any consequence for the real variables in the economy. Thus, this version of Ricardian Equivalence applies in the present equilibrium.
9. [1] assumes that human capital cannot be accumulated, thus precluding endogenous growth.
10.I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting and encouraging this line of work.
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